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This paper explores the extent of current UK government spending on science and technology
placed in its recent historical context. The allocation of this spending across the different arms of
government, the primary purposes of the expenditures undertaken and the extent to which the
government performs as well as funds R&D are also explored, with some international comparisons
analysed. The political and institutional processes that determine the revealed patterns of
expenditure in the UK, the rationales behind such spending and the aims and objectives of the main
spending departments are discussed, as is the interaction with EU expenditures on science and
technology. The effectiveness of or pay-off to government support of this kind is also considered
before future spending plans are addressed.
JEL classification: H, O.
I. INTRODUCTION
The UK government, in common with the governments of most developed
economies, expends large amounts annually either directly upon, or in support
of, scientific and technological activities. The aim of this paper is to review this
expenditure. In the sections below, I will address several issues. I begin by
looking at the extent of current government spending and place this in its recent
historical context. I then move to consider what arms of government incur the
relevant expenditures, the primary purposes of the expenditures undertaken and
the extent to which the government performs as well as funds R&D. These
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patterns are then considered in the context of a comparison with other OECD
economies.
Following this review of spending patterns, Section III addresses the political
and institutional processes that determine the revealed patterns of expenditure in
the UK, the rationales behind such spending and the aims and objectives of the
main spending departments. A special discussion then follows in Section IV on
how national patterns of such expenditure interact with EU expenditures on
science and technology.
Section V of the paper addresses the effectiveness of or pay-off to
government support of this kind before the penultimate section addresses future
spending plans. Some conclusions are provided in Section VII.
II. PATTERNS OF UK GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
1. Source and Definitions
In contrast to, for example, Germany or increasingly France, public support for
science and technology in the UK is largely the preserve of central government
(defining central government to include the Scottish Office, the Welsh Office
and the Northern Ireland Office). In Germany, on the other hand, the Länder are
important providers of such support (for example, they are the main funders of
universities), but the level of local authority spending on such activities is not
important in the UK. Of course, this pattern may well change with devolution,
especially if one redefines the Scottish Office and the Welsh Office as no longer
part of central government.
The patterns of central government funding of science and technology have
been well documented since the early 1980s in a series of publications. These
included annual HMSO editions of the Annual Review of Government Funded
Research and Development, which was followed by Forward Look, which in
turn has been replaced by Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998
(SET98). Over the years, there have been refinements to the statistics and some
redefinitions, but intertemporal comparisons are largely reasonable. SET98 is the
source for all the data used here (except where otherwise stated) and covers
realised outcomes in the accounting years 1986–87 to 1997–98 (the 1997–98
figures are estimated outcomes). The notes to the statistics in this publication
detail the changes in methods of collection and calculation and thus any
problems of intertemporal comparisons. Earlier data are taken from the other
publications already mentioned except where specified.
In the period since the statistics were first published, there has been a
changing emphasis in what is made available. The latest statistics emphasise
science, engineering and technology (SET) activities in the UK, whereas earlier
statistics emphasised research and development (R&D). SET is taken to includeGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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not only R&D but also technology transfer activities (‘activities associated with
research and development and contributing to the dissemination and application
of scientific and technical knowledge’ — SET98, p. 1) and scientific and
technical postgraduate education and training.
In the statistics, science is defined as ‘the systematic study of nature and
behaviour of the material and physical universe’ whereas technology is the
‘practical application of this knowledge especially in industry and commerce’.
This is not the only or even generally most useful means of distinction (see
Dasgupta and David (1987)). Research and development concerns the ‘gathering
and use of new scientific and technological information, involving theoretical
conjecture, observation, experiment, measurement and deduction’ (SET98, p. 1).
The OECD has for many years collected and published internationally
comparative statistics on R&D on the basis of the definitions laid out in the (so-
called) Frascati Manual. This makes international comparisons generally valid.
There is a mass of data available but I present data for only a limited number
of years. I have chosen to concentrate upon 1997–98 as the latest year for which
out-turn data are available, the three years immediately prior to this as indicators
of recent history, 1987–88 as an indicator of 10 years prior, and occasionally
1981–82 as an indicator of much more distant history, being the earliest date for
which good data are available.
2. Total UK Public Expenditure on SET and R&D
Table 1 provides data on a number of indicators of total UK government
spending on SET and R&D. These data tell a very clear story. First, total
government expenditure on SET and R&D has, over the last 10 years, been on a
downward trend. Although an increase is recorded between 1994–95 and 1995–
96, the increase is less than the NHS spend that is excluded from the 1994–95
statistics. In fact, government expenditure on R&D (excluding the NHS) peaked
in 1985–86 at £6,955 million (in 1996–97 prices). This decline in government
spend is obviously reflected in declines in such spends relative to GDP, total
government spending and the total R&D spend in the economy. One may also
note that the share of non-R&D activities in total SET (excluding the NHS) has
been declining. This stood at 4.1 per cent in 1986–87 and had fallen to 2.2 per
cent in 1997–98, although it did increase slightly between 1994–95 and 1995–
96.
3. Departmental Spends
One means to explore the pattern of government R&D spending is to look at the
spending by individual government departments. For this purpose, I split the data
down by departments or ministries, with the Research Councils treated as if they
were government departments. However, the Research Councils are really quite
different organisations from government departments. Over the years,Fiscal Studies
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government departments have also been amalgamated and renamed, and thus
presentation is a little messy. Table 2, however, presents some summary
indications of spending patterns in 1997–98 and 1987–88.
Consider first the allocation of funding in 1997–98. We observe that the
MOD share is 34.5 per cent, the total civil departments’ share is 21.6 per cent,
the science budget share (OST plus the Research Councils) is 21.2 per cent and
the HE Funding Council share is 17 per cent. Compared with 1987–88, the MOD
share has fallen from 42.7 per cent and the civil departments’ share has fallen
from 24.9 per cent whereas the science budget share has risen from 13.9 per cent
and the higher education (HE) funding share has increased from 16.2 per cent.
However, as these are shares in a reducing total, the actual changes in total
expenditure are also worth noting. The MOD spend has fallen 29.5 per cent in
real terms, the civil departments’ spend has fallen by 24.4 per cent, the HE
funding spend has decreased by 9 per cent and only the science budget has
increased, that increase being 33 per cent.
Thus, although the MOD is still the largest public spender on R&D and
spends more than all the civil departments put together, the MOD spend has been
falling faster than that of the civil departments (both spends have been reducing).
The spend on HE funding has slightly increased its share, but within a falling
TABLE 1
Total UK Government Spending on SET and R&D
£ million, 1996–97 prices
1997–98 1996–97 1995–96 1994–95 1987–88 1981–82
Total GSET
a 6,143 6,301.5 6,365.7 6,006.8 7,052.3 n.a.
NHS
a 390 407.6 356.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total GFR&D 5,625 5,759.3 5,798.5 5,491.5 6,643.9 6,704.3
EU contribution
b 352 373.3 353.3 317.2 165.4 63.0
GFR&D/G% 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 4.0 n.a.
GFR&D/GERD%
c n.a. 31.8 33.2 33.2 38.8 n.a.
GFR&D/GDP%
c n.a. 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 n.a.
aNHS only included from 1995–96.
bAn indicative measure of the UK contribution to the EU R&D budget and included in the R&D and SET
totals.
cSourced from OECD data.
Notes:
GSET is total government expenditure on science, engineering and technology.
GFR&D is government expenditure on R&D.
G is total government expenditure.
GERD is gross national expenditure on R&D.
GDP is gross domestic product.
Sources: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 7.1; Annual Review of Government
Funded R&D (1991), Table 1.6.6.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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total this means a reduced spend. The science budget has been increasing in real
terms (although very recently — see below — the pattern is slightly different)
and thus also increasing its share.
Within the civil departments, we observe a number of points worthy of
comment. The major spenders in 1997–98 are, in order, the NHS, the DTI, the
DETR, MAFF, the DFEE and the DFID. Compared with 1987–88, we have no
figures for the NHS; for the DETR, the relative comparators are the DOE and the
DOT whose total expenditure in 1987–88 was less, while MAFF spending has
reduced considerably. This is at least partly attributable to a policy of
progressive withdrawal from the provision of subsidised agricultural advice
which was completed by March 1996.
TABLE 2
SET Allocations by Department




OST 27 OST n.a.
Research Councils 1,276 Research Councils 980.3
HE funding 1,042 HE funding 1,145.6
MAFF 142 MAFF 212.1
DFEE 83 DFE+ED 162.2
DETR 150 DOE+DOT 134.8
DH 57 DHSS 71.9
NHS 390 NHS n.a.
DFID 82 ODA 49.0
DTI 341 DTI+DEn 864.9
Net Launch Aid –107 Net Launch Aid 40.2
NI departments 35 NI departments 25.3
SO 73 SO 83.1
WO 3 WO 2.9
Other civil 76 Other civil 106.5
MOD 2,121 MOD 3,008.2
EU contribution 352 EU contribution 165.4
Total 6,143 Total 7,052.3
aA list of abbreviations appears at the end of this article.
Notes: Changes in the methods of calculation make comparisons of higher education research pre- and post-
1993–94 problematic. New ways of collecting the NHS spend introduced in 1995–96 preclude the inclusion
of a comparable figure prior to that date. The OST is entered as part of the science base although it is a (ring-
fenced) part of the DTI.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 2.2.Fiscal Studies
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The DTI is a slightly more complex case which will be discussed in some
more detail in Section III. The current DTI incorporates the Office of Science
and Technology (which is accounted for separately), has responsibility for
aerospace and thus the Launch Aid scheme which is discussed in Section V, and
also incorporates what used to be the Department of Energy. The DTI and the
Department of Energy had a combined SET spend of £864.9 million in 1987–88.
By 1997–98, the DTI spend (excluding Launch Aid and the OST) was only £341
million. Given that the DTI is the main department responsible for stimulating
technological innovation in UK industry, the extent of this withdrawal of
funding is dramatic.
One of the long-term trends in departmental civil spending on R&D has been
the increasing importance of the DTI and the centralisation of responsibilities for
civil R&D spending. Historically, support for civil technology development in
UK industry (excluding agriculture and the NHS) was concentrated upon
aerospace, nuclear energy, computers (or IT) and other general industry support
programmes. At various times, these spending responsibilities have been
allocated to the Department of Energy, an Aircraft Ministry and the Department
of Industry, or their equivalents in name. In 1964, the new Labour government
created the Ministry of Technology which was an attempt to centralise in one
department nearly all government support for R&D spending directed at British
industry. That department eventually disappeared. However, since then the DTI
has become responsible for all these areas of policy. With the inclusion of the
OST in the DTI (although ring-fenced), the concept of a Ministry of Technology
has in fact been re-created under another name.
Finally, we may note that, in real terms, the EU contribution (which is
discussed further in Section IV) has more than doubled between 1987–88 and
1997–98, indicating the growing involvement of the UK in EU technology
programmes.
4. Military vs. Civil R&D
The high level of government R&D funding attributed to the MOD exemplifies
that UK government R&D spending has a strong defence bias. It is clear,
however, that this bias is reducing over time. The MOD share in 1997–98 was
34.5 per cent but this compares with a 1987–88 share of 42.7 per cent. The
Office for National Statistics (1999) illustrates that the 1997 government spend
on military R&D represented 62 per cent of all military R&D spending in the
UK, which is a slight increase on a figure of 60 per cent in 1992. Of the
government spend, one-third was spent on government-performed R&D in 1997,
compared with 30 per cent in 1992. Thus, although the military spend has
reduced in real terms and as a share of the total government R&D spend, the
government-funded share of military R&D and the government-performed share
have remained approximately constant since 1992.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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5. Primary Purposes
There are a number of ways of exploring the primary purposes or objectives of
government expenditure on R&D. This section explores two. The first is a quite
British classification that breaks down government spending according to the
following categories (see SET98, p. 3):
(a)  general support for research — all basic R&D that advances knowledge,
including support for postgraduate studentships;
(b)  government services — R&D relevant to any aspect of government service
provision, including all of defence R&D;
(c)  policy support — R&D to inform government policy;
(d)  technology support — applied R&D that advances technology underpinning
the UK economy, excluding defence;
(e)  technology transfer;
(f)  other, including postgraduate taught courses.
The relevant out-turn figures are included in Table 3. As can be seen, in
1997–98, government services is the largest funded primary purpose, taking
almost half the funding. This includes all of defence R&D and thus the finding is
not surprising. However, compared with 1989–90, the share of primary purpose
b has reduced very little although the defence spend has reduced considerably.
There has thus been a considerable shift from military spending directed at
purpose b towards civil spending directed at purpose b. The second largest
category in 1997–98 is general support, i.e. all basic R&D that advances
knowledge, including support for postgraduate studentships. Given that we have
seen above that the science budget and HE spending are a large share of the total,
this is again not surprising. However, this share has increased considerably since
1989–90 (largely at the expense of technology support). We thus observe a shift
of resources from the support of applied R&D for support of technology in
TABLE 3
Primary Purposes
Per cent of government SET spend
Purpose 1997–98 1989–90
General support 38.7 27.2
Government services 48.0 49.8
Policy support 6.1 5.3
Technology support 4.3 13.5
Technology transfer 2.1 2.9
Other 0.8 1.1
Note: NHS included only in 1997–98 figures.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 3.6.Fiscal Studies
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industry towards more support for the science and basic end of the spectrum.
One must always hold in mind, however, that these changes in share are taking
place in an environment where the total spend has been reducing.
A second way to look at primary purpose is through the socio-economic
objectives of government funding. Here we constrain ourselves to just the R&D
spend rather than the SET spend. The relevant data are presented in Table 4 (the
latest data available are for 1996–97).
The first obvious point to make about these data is the overwhelming
importance of defence and the advancement of knowledge in 1996–97. This
reflects again the importance of military R&D in the UK government spend and
also the spend on HE and the science budget. Of equal interest is the
intertemporal comparison. Although the defence spend has reduced in
importance somewhat, we also see (a) a large increase in the share going to the
advancement of knowledge and (b) considerable reductions in the spend on
energy and industrial development. This is as should be expected, given how we
have seen departmental spends changing above.
6. Basic R&D, Applied R&D and Experimental Development
Yet another way to explore the breakdown of government spending on R&D is
to split it into basic and applied R&D and experimental development. These
days, one may also separate basic R&D into pure and orientated and separate
TABLE 4
Socio-Economic Objectives of UK Government R&D Spending
Per cent of total
Objective 1996–97 1986–87
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.5 4.7
Industrial development 2.5 10.5
Energy 0.7 4.4
Infrastructure 1.7 1.5
Environmental protection 2.2 1.1
Health 14.5 4.5
Social development and services 2.1 1.5
Earth and atmosphere 1.7 1.9
Advancement of knowledge 29.7 21.5





Note: NHS included only in 1996–97 figures.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 3.8.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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applied R&D into strategic and specific. The relevant data are presented in Table
5 (the 1996–97 data are the latest available). One should note that, by definition,
the MOD is considered to undertake no basic R&D.
In 1996–97, applied research constitutes about 40 per cent of the total, basic
32 per cent and experimental development 27 per cent. It should be noted,
however, that in defence, development is 67 per cent of the total and applied
makes up the balance. In the civil departments, only 6 per cent is basic, 9 per
cent is development and applied makes up 85 per cent of the total. In the
Research Councils, not surprisingly, basic makes up 59 per cent, applied 40 per
cent and experimental development only 0.7 per cent of the total.
One may note that the changes since 1986–87 are consistent with the patterns
we have seen above. The total basic share has increased markedly, in line with
the growing importance of the science spend in the total budget. The
experimental development share has fallen considerably. This has occurred in
both the defence and civil ministry spends. However, the reduction is more
marked in the civil ministry spends and could be seen as a withdrawal by
government from near market R&D, i.e. support for R&D aimed at technologies
that are near to market launch. This will be discussed further below.
7. Government-Performed R&D
The UK government not only funds R&D. It also performs R&D. Table 6 details
the share of economy-wide R&D performed by government and other relevant
sectors (data for 1996 are the latest available; they are on an annual rather than
financial-year basis). The total amount of R&D performed by government is
approximately 14 per cent of total R&D performed in the UK. In 1986, it was
also 14 per cent. This compares with the share of UK R&D funded by
government of about 32 per cent in 1996. The government clearly funds more
TABLE 5
Type of Research Activity
Per cent of total government spend
Type 1996–97 1986–87
Total basic 32.1 19.6
Pure 23.0
Orientated 9.1
Total applied 40.6 37.5
Strategic 19.3 15.7
Specific 21.3 21.8
Experimental development 27.3 42.8
Note: NHS included only in 1996–97 figures.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 3.5.Fiscal Studies
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R&D than it performs. However, it is somewhat surprising that, with the process
of ‘privatisation’ of government R&D facilities, there has not been a falling
share of R&D performed by government. To some degree, this is because of
accounting conventions. In the Annual Review of Government Funded R&D
(1991), a timetable is presented (p. 59) of the dates at which formerly wholly
government-controlled laboratories became or were to become executive
agencies. However, it is also stated (p. 44) ‘that staff engaged in and expenditure
on R&D in agencies are included in the departmental total’. Where
‘privatisation’ meant the creation of executive agencies, therefore, the total
department spends may not fully reflect the extent to which R&D performance
was being privatised. However, with full privatisation of, for example, the
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) from 1997, the
Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) from 1996–97, British Rail Engineering
(BRE) from 1997–98, Warren Springs from 1994, the Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE) from 1993 and a number of other small agencies over the
years, there may well be more reductions in government-performed R&D to be
expected.
It is interesting to list for the main spending departments what proportion of
their R&D was undertaken in-house (intramural) in 1997–98: MAFF, 57 per
cent; MOD, 33 per cent; DFID, 3.6 per cent; DTI, 2.0 per cent; NI departments,
28 per cent; SO, 72.2 per cent; WO, 33 per cent. There are thus considerable
differences across departments. The small figure for the DTI obviously reflects
the true privatisation of its executive agencies. The extent to which MOD work
is still in-house is an obvious contrast (although, as discussed below, this may
well change in the future).
TABLE 6
UK R&D by Performing Sector
1996 prices
Sector 1996 1986
Total government 2,070 1,925
Government departments 1,495
Research Councils 575
Higher education 2,792 2,045
Business enterprise 9,301 9,447
Private non-profit 177 273
Total 14,340 13,689
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 6.2.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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8. International Comparisons
Using OECD data, we may make a number of international comparisons. The
usual countries considered in these comparisons are France (F), Germany (G),
Italy (I), Japan (J) and the US. The OECD data have a number of breaks in series
between 1990, 1991 and 1992. We thus look at 1996 (the latest year) and 1992.
The relevant data are presented in Tables 7a and 7b.
One may make a number of relevant observations upon these data.
!  In terms of total gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) relative to GDP, only
Italy is lower than the UK. The other four comparators all devote a greater
share of their GDP to R&D. Moreover, except for Japan, all the comparators
show declining shares of GDP devoted to R&D, and in this the UK is not out
of line.
!  The share of GERD financed by government is lower in the UK than in all
the comparators except Japan. This share has also been falling in all the
comparators except Germany (where reunification may have had a role to
play) and Japan.
TABLE 7a
UK R&D: International Comparisons
Per cent
Indicator UK F G I J US
GERD/GDP 1996 1.94 2.31 2.28 1.13 2.77 2.52
GERD/GDP 1992 2.13 2.42 2.48 1.20 2.76 2.74
GFRD/GERD 1996 31.8 42.3 37.3 46.2 20.9 34.6
GFRD/GERD 1992 33.4 43.5 36.0 48.5 17.5 37.7
HERD/GDP 1996 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.25 0.40 0.38
HERD/GDP 1992 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.27 0.35 0.40
GPRD/GERD 1996 14.4 20.4 15.3 19.9 10.4 9.0
DEFENCE/GFRD 1996 37.2 28.9 9.8 4.7 5.8 54.7
DEFENCE/GFRD 1992 40.8 35.7 10.0 7.1 5.9 58.6
Notes:
GERD is gross national expenditure on R&D.
GDP is gross domestic product.
GFRD is government-funded R&D.
HERD is higher education R&D.
GPRD is government-performed R&D.
DEFENCE is government-funded defence R&D.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 7.1.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 7b
International Comparisons by Objectives, 1996
Per cent of government-funded R&D
Objective UK F G I J US
Industrial development 2.5 4.8 13.3 8.8 3.4 0.6
Energy 0.7 4.7 3.4 3.1 23.3 3.6
Health 14.5 5.2 3.3 8.8 3.5 17.6
Advancement of knowledge 29.7 35.2 52.2 52.8 48.6 4.1
Civil space 2.8 10.9 5.0 8.7 6.6 11.4
Defence 37.2 28.9 9.8 4.7 5.8 54.7
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 7.8.
!  The share of GDP devoted to higher education R&D differs little across
countries (except for Italy where it is relatively low). The slight increase in
this share shown in the UK between 1992 and 1996 is also present in France
and Japan.
!  The share of GERD performed by government, at 14.4 per cent, is low in the
UK compared with France, Italy and Germany but high compared with Japan
and the US. This reflects the greater prevalence of government-owned
research establishments in the former countries and the greater share of R&D
undertaken by private enterprise in the last two.
!  The share of defence spending in total government-funded R&D is high in the
UK, France and the US (mission-orientated countries according to the Ergas
(1987) definition) and low in Germany, Italy and Japan (the more diffusion-
orientated countries).
III. THE DETERMINATION OF UK GOVERNMENT R&D PRIORITIES
AND SPENDING PATTERNS
1. The Process of Spending Determination
There is no centralised SET or R&D budget in UK government.
1 In this, the UK
is similar to most other European economies (except perhaps France where one
ministry has a centralised budget that it then distributes to other ministries).
Instead, individual ministries determine their own R&D spends, given their own
priorities and the limits of their annual total budgets agreed with the Treasury.
The system is known as ‘frame budgeting’.
Until recently, this system operated on an annual cycle, although since 1998 a
three-year horizon has been employed. Given the limits upon the totality of
government spending determined by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Cabinet,
rounds of bilateral meetings between the Treasury and individual ministries or
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departments take place. The main purpose of these meetings is to agree the total
spending of each ministry or department. These discussions tend to be primarily
concerned with the total spend rather than the detail of the spends of the
individual departments. Thus, although discussion may take place relating to a
department’s spend on R&D, the discussion is unlikely to reduce to a discussion
of individual projects (unless the projects are very large). Once the total budget
has been agreed for any department, that department will then determine the
allocation of the funding, including the allocation to R&D, according to its own
priorities. The mechanism is slightly different for the science budget. The OST
discusses the size of this budget directly with the Treasury. It is the case,
however, that the Treasury will not, in general, discuss the detail of that budget
but will be concerned more with the total size.
Such an arrangement may seem to be a very loose one, implying no overall
technology or R&D strategy and with the potential to leave gaps or generate
duplication in government spend on R&D. There are, however, a number of
checks and balances in place to correct or prevent this. First, there are many
interdepartmental committees and groups that address issues of departmental co-
operation and interaction in the R&D process. Second, one of the functions of
the OST is to oversee the totality of government spend on R&D and to make
recommendations to both departments and the Cabinet on duplication and
omissions. Although these recommendations of the OST do not have executive
authority, it is a brave minister who ignores them. Third, in the bilateral
discussions with the Treasury, evaluations of past support activity may well be
one of the factors discussed in the determination of future budgets and, if so,
effectiveness in the R&D spend is a key to future budgets.
It is still, however, the case that this system does not necessarily generate a
consistent unified technology strategy for the UK. The spending pattern is still
very much the result of a number of different individuals and ministries making
separate spending decisions. Partly as a reaction to such views, the last
Conservative government instituted the Technology Foresight exercise. This
exercise (which is currently being repeated) involved a process of widespread
consultation upon those areas of science and technology in which the UK (as a
whole) might best invest. The results of this exercise are being used to inform
government R&D spending decisions (although it must be admitted that they
appear to have had more influence on the Research Councils than on other
spenders). The government, of course, has no control over the spending
decisions of the private sector, and thus whether the recommendations have been
influential in that area is another matter.
Technology Foresight exercises of this kind have also been undertaken in the
Netherlands, Finland and Germany, for example. It is worth noting, however,
that whereas in the UK the main objective was to spot technologies that might
best contribute to improved competitiveness, in other countries (for example, the
Netherlands) there was also a matching concern with the quality of life. The UKFiscal Studies
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Foresight exercise currently under way has to some degree redressed this
imbalance.
Although individual government departments and ministries do have
considerable freedom to determine their own R&D spending and priorities, the
UK political system does tend to ensure that, at a general level at least, the
different ministries and departments have common attitudes. Thus, for example,
the various Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 had a general belief in
the efficacy of market forces. This led not only to privatisation but also to a
general reconsideration of government R&D support programmes, especially in
the DTI. The view that ‘if it was worth doing, then the private sector would do it
without government intervention’ led to a wholesale withdrawal of the DTI from
general technology support programmes and, in particular, withdrawal from
support of near market R&D. Similarly, a belief in the importance of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) as a source of dynamism in the economy led to
reorientation of support away from large firms towards smaller firms. In
addition, desires to reduce government spending and to promote efficiency have
led to growing demands for ex post evaluation of programmes.
This is not to say that individual government ministers did not or do not still
have influence on individual departments’ spends. One may observe many
examples where, in individual ministries, a change of personality at the top has
led to a change of policy. The point is that the prevailing political philosophy of
the party in power tends to influence, at a general level, the size and nature of
any public spending programmes in place. It also means that, as the party in
power changes, so the underlying philosophy will tend to change. The election of
a Labour government in 1997 has not seen a radical change in prevailing
attitudes so far; however, we have already seen: (a) the introduction of an R&D
tax credit for SMEs when such tax credits were always considered undesirable
under the previous government; (b) announcements of future increased spending
on science over and above the amount considered desirable by the previous
government; and (c) an emphasis in the last Budget and in the latest
Competitiveness White Paper on the importance of technology to the UK
economy and in particular how the UK (especially the government) must invest
to become a full member of the information economy.
The role of Parliament in the determination of government R&D spending is
limited. There are effective House of Lords and House of Commons Select
Committees on Science and Technology which over the years have issued
critical reports on government R&D support activities. There is, however, little
evidence that these reports have been particularly influential. In general,
Parliament has not undertaken reviews of government SET support activities at a
detailed level (except perhaps to investigate certain large defence projects that
failed).
In addition to the general issues of the determination of the level of spending
upon technology support and the areas to be supported, there is also an issue asGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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to who should perform the technology activities being funded. From the late
1960s, there has been general acceptance in government of the ‘contractor–
customer’ principle, whereby the same institution of government should not be
both the funder and performer of research. This principle has two advantages in
that the separation of customer and contractor (a) should promote efficiency in
the research process and (b) should promote objectivity on the part of the
contractor. This latter issue is one of the reasons for the separation of
universities from government via the Research Councils.
In the 1991 Annual Review, the government argued that the spinning-off of
previously in-house research establishments as executive agencies, many of
which were then later more fully privatised, enabled an extension of the
customer–contractor principle (as well as enabling such institutes to compete for
privately funded research more effectively). This spinning-off may well have
also been a further reflection of Conservative belief in the efficacy of the market.
It is difficult to be precise as to the extent to which there is separation of
customer and contractor in government R&D spending. We have seen above
how the amount of government-funded R&D performed intramurally differs
across ministries. There are, however, some data (Table 8) for 1996–97 that are
more indicative of the current position. Although there are considerable
difficulties in determining what is a competitive allocation mechanism and what
is not (see, for example, Cave et al. (1999)), these figures suggest a considerable
degree of competition in the allocation process.
2. Why Should Government Spend on SET?
The previous section has explored the process by which spending levels and
patterns are determined. It does not answer the key question of why the
government should spend on R&D and SET. In Table 3, some data were
presented on the principal purposes of such spending, which to some degree help
TABLE 8






Total expenditure (£m) 1,302.5 1,444.7 2,143.7 4,890.9
Expenditure on contracts (£m) 705.9 1,193.2 1,800.7 3,699.8
Expenditure on competitive
contracts (£m)
651.4 747.2 1,628.7 3,027.2
Percentage of total expenditure
subject to competition
50.0 51.7 76.0 61.9
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 2.6.Fiscal Studies
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to answer why. In particular, we see that some spending is for policy support, i.e.
to inform government policy. This is quite appropriate. The government requires
information in order to frame policy and also to negotiate with private sector
contractors effectively. However, such spending is only about 6 per cent of the
total. Another primary purpose is for government services, which is R&D
relevant to any aspect of government service provision, including all of defence
R&D. The principle here is that the government is the major provider of, for
example, defence services, and, as such, should fund the R&D for such services.
This element comprises almost 50 per cent of the government R&D spend.
However, just because the government is the major customer, it does not
necessarily mean that government should fund the R&D. The government, for
example, instead of funding the development of a new torpedo, could promise to
buy from a contractor a torpedo that the contractor had expended its own
resources upon developing. In fact, over the last 10 years, there have been
considerable changes in the relationships between the MOD and its suppliers
whereby more of the responsibility for the funding of R&D is left with the
contractor, as well as a move away from cost-plus to fixed-price contracts that
have shifted the risk from government to the contractor. Having said this,
however, such R&D is seen as somewhat different from the other R&D spends
of government. It is, as its label implies, seen as a necessary part of delivering
the services to the populace that the government considers to be part of its
political remit.
The remaining 50 per cent of government R&D spending is for four other
purposes: general support for research, technology support, technology transfer
and others. Such spending is generally directed at stimulating the scientific and
technological performance of the economy and, as such, has to be justified on
other grounds. A prerequisite to such justification is a belief that innovation will
yield improvements in competitiveness and economic welfare. Justification then
tends to fall into two separate categories: (a) on the basis of international
comparisons, i.e. UK economic performance is seen as not satisfactory and
improvements in the scientific and technological performance of the economy
would assist in overcoming this problem; and (b) the economy suffers from
market failures in its SET performance which means that the government should
intervene. It should be noted that these are quite separate arguments. It may be
that UK performance is not satisfactory in terms of international comparison, but
this need not necessarily be due to market failures. All economies will suffer
similar market failures and thus it is difficult to argue that market failures cause
differences in technological performance.
The international comparison argument as a justification for government
support of R&D needs little further explanation. Policymakers will look at the
performance of other economies and wish to replicate what the good performers
are achieving. However, there is no strong evidence (see OECD (1998)) to
suggest that policies can be simply transferred across national boundaries whenGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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there are extensive cultural and structural differences. Nor does there seem to be
any acceptance in government that a good rationale for any particular policy is
that other countries are doing the same (note tax credits for R&D), although an
academic literature on strategic trade policy might be used to support a contrary
view. However, inferior relative performance can often be taken as a good
general rationale for the need for policy. Of course, the desire to stimulate UK
technological performance is not itself a justification for government spending
on SET. There are many policies open to government, of which direct spending
is only one. The choice of actual policy is more a matter of consideration of what
policies will be the most cost-effective.
The market failure argument — the argument most favoured by economists
— merits greater discussion. Market failure is said to exist when the free market
will not generate a welfare optimal outcome. All the literature (see, for example,
Stoneman (1987)) suggests that there is market failure in innovation. Reasons for
market failure are various and encompass, inter alia: appropriability problems
whereby the innovator is unable to appropriate (through, for example,
externalities, copying or pricing) the whole social benefits of his or her
innovative efforts; excessive risk aversion on the part of either innovators or
capital markets in the presence of incomplete insurance markets; informational
externalities; and indivisibilities. All of these will tend to lead to
underinvestment in SET. On the other hand, common pool problems may lead to
excessive repetition of R&D and/or excessive speed or overinvestment in the
development and launching of new products and processes.
If market failure does lead to suboptimal investment, there is a rationale for
government intervention. The problem with this rationale, however, is that it is
difficult to operationalise. Civil servants will often accept the potential for
market failure but will query whether it is a practical tool for deciding where to
direct intervention and the level of intervention required (see, for example,
Barber and White (1987)). It is also by no means obvious that government
spending is the best means to correct market failure; it may be that tax breaks or
information-spreading programmes will be more suitable.
The area where the market failure argument is used most frequently is basic
R&D. It is commonly argued that, given that basic R&D has no particular
application in view, there is little potential for the innovator to realise the
benefits of his or her discoveries and thus, without intervention, there will be
underinvestment in basic R&D. We have been informed that, in discussion about
the size of the science budget in the annual spending rounds, the OST, which
presents the case for the science budget, uses the market failure argument and the
Treasury accepts the argument. However, little attempt is made to apply the
argument on a project-by-project basis.
To a large extent, the market failure argument is thus used to justify
government investment in science. Again, however, one might ask why directFiscal Studies
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government spending is employed. It would be possible to give tax breaks to
private investors who fund science in universities instead.
Government investment in science raises a related issue. The basic
justification for such investment is market failure. Thus the free market would
not invest enough in science from a welfare point of view and, without
government involvement, there would be insufficient knowledge and skills in the
economy. However, the science budget is primarily allocated to universities.
Although the Technology Foresight exercise has recently been put in place to
inform the distribution of this budget to areas of greatest national technological
advantage, it is still the case that the researchers in universities who are spending
the budget are not primarily interested in the technological applications of the
research that they undertake. They are generally producing information for the
public domain that will raise their own estimation in the eyes of their peers. The
actual process of allocating and spending the science budget may thus generate
its own market failures (Dasgupta and David, 1987). This is not to suggest that
there is no pay-off to the science budget (see below), nor is it to suggest that the
potential pay-offs to basic research can be reliably predicted; it is more to
suggest that current allocation mechanisms will not necessarily replicate the
allocations that a free market might make in the absence of market failure.
Finally in this section, I might state the obvious. The existence of market
failure or internationally comparative underinvestment in SET does not of itself
merit government intervention. It must be the case that the intervention will be
effective. I return to consider this point further below.
3. The Main Spending Departments
This section looks in some brief detail at the spends and policies of three main
components of the government SET machine. It starts with the MOD, then
considers the DTI, before finally considering the total OST, Research Councils
and HE budget.
(a) The Ministry of Defence
Although the MOD spend on R&D has been declining recently, it is still the
largest of all the government departments. The whole spend is considered to be
non-basic. The MOD maintains that its prime responsibility is the defence of the
UK and, as such, although civil spin-offs are to be welcomed, it has no particular
responsibility towards wealth creation or competitiveness in the UK economy
(although the MOD involvement in arms exporting suggests that the MOD is
concerned with the prosperity of the UK defence sector).
There are a number of issues that can be raised with respect to the MOD
R&D spend:Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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!  To what extent should the MOD commission new products and to what extent
should it buy off-the-shelf equipment? Inclining towards the latter option
would tend to reduce R&D spend.
!  If the MOD wishes to commission new technology, to what extent should it
finance the R&D? It is possible that new defence equipment can be
commissioned, with the contractor funding the R&D. For example, in most
supply chains, the final customer would not finance suppliers’ R&D. One
would expect the suppliers to fund the R&D and to recover that R&D through
sales to the final customer. There are reasons why the final customer might
fund the R&D (for example, the supplier cannot raise the funding) but that
seems unlikely in the case of the defence industry. Of course, if prototypes
are being developed, there may be more of an argument for customer funding.
!  If external contractors are to develop and produce new defence technologies,
what are the optimal contractual arrangements? Some 20 years ago, nearly all
contracts were of the cost-plus form. However, now there is a much greater
emphasis upon fixed-price contracts. Such contracts not only provide a
greater incentive for the contractor to be efficient but also shift the risk from
the government to the contractor. However, such contract forms will require
that the MOD spends more on R&D informing itself so that new contracts
may be ‘fair’.
!  How efficient is defence R&D? There have been a number of high-profile
failures of defence R&D projects (for example, the UK AWACS aircraft and
torpedo development). There is some evidence to suggest, however, that such
failures are no more or less common in the defence sector than for similar
complex projects in the civil sector (for example, certain civil software
development projects in the public sector).
!  To what extent should MOD defence research be undertaken in-house? It has
always been the case that much MOD research has been undertaken by
private sector contractors. In addition, since 1991, the MOD has been trying
to put greater distance between its research funding and research performance
activities. Through the Defence Research Agency to 1994 and then the
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), the majority of the
MOD’s non-nuclear research performance activities have been amalgamated
into a single organisation managed as a trading fund. This was undertaken in
order to (a) impose a formal customer–supplier relationship, (b) encourage
greater collaboration with the civil sector and (c) help ensure the exchange of
technologies between the civil and military sectors.
!  To what extent should defence technology be developed alone or as part of an
international collaborative effort? Collaboration can, inter alia, share costs
and spread risks as well as open up a wider market for products developed.
Over the last 10 years, collaborative arrangements with Europe in particular
have become more important.Fiscal Studies
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!  Are there externalities to defence R&D in terms of civil spin-offs? The MOD
has for long attempted to encourage such spin-offs, and such externalities are
often seen as a reason for supporting defence spending on R&D. However,
the externalities cannot themselves justify the R&D. If civil usage is the
objective, then surely it would be better to direct the spending into that area.
In its list of prime contributions from its R&D spend, the MOD includes ‘co-
operating with industry and other government departments to ensure that
scientific knowledge and technical innovation generated both within and
outside the MOD is exploited both for defence purposes and by industry in
support of wealth creation’ (Forward Look 1995, vol. 2, p. 55).
Mechanisms considered to encourage civil spin-off include: (a) the use of
private sector contractors to perform defence R&D who may spin off
expertise into their civil activities; (b) the establishment of Dual Use
Technology Centres to encourage collaboration between DERA, industry and
academia; and (c) the granting of licences for technology developed by the
MOD. One should note as well that, in 1995, the MOD was talking of the
need for greater alignment between civil and defence sectors. This may also
encourage spin-off. However, on the other hand, there may be spin-off from
the civil sector to the defence sector that is at least as large as vice versa.
On an institutional level, the MOD maintains an overview of its SET
activities through a Defence Research Committee chaired by the Department
Chief Scientific Adviser. An independent view of its research programme is
provided to the Minister by the Defence Scientific Research Council (DSRC)
and its five supporting boards. These draw their members from academia and
industry. In other work (Diederen et al., 1999), we have also been informed that
the MOD has members sitting on a number of interdepartmental bodies that
address issues of complementarity in departmental research programmes. This
would be particularly relevant in cases such as aerospace where the DTI is
responsible for civil aircraft and the MOD for military aircraft.
(b) The Department of Trade and Industry
Although, as explained above, the DTI has, over the last 15 years, taken on the
responsibility for those areas of government industrial R&D policy that were the
largest-spending (aircraft, IT, energy), its current R&D spend is only a shadow
of the sums that once were being expended. In addition, as we have seen above,
the DTI has ‘privatised’ nearly all of its in-house research institutes and thus the
DTI now does very little in-house research.
In fact, the DTI now considers its main activities as regards innovation to be
‘to give higher priority to supporting technology transfer, spreading best
practice, and accessing and exploiting existing technology rather than to
developing new technology.... DTI activities are now concentrating more on
influencing the broad environment which allows innovative firms to flourish andGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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less on the explicit development of technology’ (Forward Look 1995, vol. 2, p.
112).
Of its 1997–98 estimated out-turn spend, £216 million (of a total SET spend
of £341 million) was considered for technology support. Of this £216 million,
£94 million went to the European Space Agency and £17 million to fusion
research. Policy support received £55 million and technology transfer £79
million. One must not, of course, forget that, to some degree at least,
responsibility for technology support has shifted to Brussels and away from
Whitehall. This is discussed further below, but even so it is clear that the DTI
has largely pulled back from not only the support of near market research but
also the support of nearly all research.
There are many different programmes offered by the DTI in pursuit of its
objectives. It would be tedious to list them all here. It is, however, worth
stressing that its programmes emphasise help for SMEs, gaining access to
overseas technology and also encouraging inward investment of R&D.
In early 1999, a new Competitiveness White Paper was issued by the DTI that
laid out a conception of future policy. Although this does not contain any major
change of strategic direction, it does have some new twists on existing policy. It
is discussed below in the general discussion of the future. In addition, the March
1999 Budget introduced some future changes with respect to DTI innovation
policy tied to the White Paper. Finally, the DTI is responsible for Launch Aid.
This is one ‘old-style’ interventionist policy that the DTI has maintained and it is
discussed separately below.
(c) The Science Budget
The whole science budget is made up of three parts — a small spend by the
Office of Science and Technology, a much larger spend by the Research
Councils and a large higher education budget.
The OST was originally created as part of the Cabinet Office but, with effect
from 1996, was relocated as part of the DTI. Although many saw in this
relocation a statement of the subservience of science and technology to the
demands of wealth creation, civil servants argued that the shift had more to do
with space in the Cabinet Office than any other issue. Within the DTI, the OST
is headed by the government Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA). The CSA advises
the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
and the Minister for Science on SET matters. The Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry has overall responsibility for the government’s science policy and
support for science and technology as a whole in his cross-departmental role as
the Cabinet Minister for Science and Technology.
The OST has two main functions. The first is the overview function discussed
above. The second is a responsibility for the science budget. Although the
science budget is not spent by the OST but is instead allocated by the ResearchFiscal Studies
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Councils, which are essentially intermediaries, it is the OST that negotiates with
the Treasury on the size of the science budget. The Director General of the
Research Councils is responsible for advising the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry and the Minster for Science on the allocation of the science budget
and for securing the successful operation of the Research Councils, with support
from the OST. There also exists the Council for Science and Technology
(COST) as an advisory body made up of independent members. The COST is
advisory to the Prime Minister on all aspects of the government’s science and
technology activities and submits its reports to him through the Cabinet Minister
for Science and Technology (the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) who
chairs the Council on behalf of the Prime Minister with the CSA as Deputy
Chairman.
The higher education budget is the responsibility of the DFEE in England
(but is spent by the HEFCE), of the Scottish Office in Scotland (but spent by the
HEFCS), of the Welsh Office in Wales (but spent by the HEFCW) and of the
Northern Ireland Office in Northern Ireland (with the NIHEC as the
intermediary).
We have seen above (Table 2) that Research Council spending has increased
over the 10 years to 1997–98; the HE funding of R&D has, however, declined
although the sum of the spends of the Research Councils and on HE funding has
increased in real terms in the 10 years to 1997–98 within a declining total
government R&D spend. To some degree, such comparisons are a little
misleading. Although the comparison of Research Council spends is valid, more
needs to be said of how the higher education R&D spends are calculated. There
was a significant change of calculation methods and coverage in 1993–94; also
in 1996 a new method was introduced to measure what proportion of HE
expenditure could be considered as research. The new method basically uses
grant income as a proxy for expenditure, with research, teaching and other grants
separately identified. The block research grant is counted as research. One-third
of the postgraduate element of the teaching grant is counted as research.
The 10-year comparison does not show, however, what has been happening
more recently. The science budget (OST plus the Research Councils) peaked in
1995–96 at £1,331 million (1996–97 prices) and then fell to £1,303 million in
1997–98. HE funding peaked at £1,073.9 million in 1994–95 and then fell to
1996–97, recovering in 1997–98 to £1,042 million. Thus the 10-year comparison
hides more recent reductions in the science budget.
The Research Council structure was changed in 1994 from a system with five
such councils to a system with seven Research Councils. The Research Councils
have extensive independence in the determination of the funds allocated to them
by the Director General of the Research Councils. However, alignment with
government objectives (such as Foresight) will tend to be rewarded by higher
allocations. The main allocation mechanism used by the various councils is peer
review. One might note, however, that the PPARC is a major funder of theGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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European Space Agency and CERN on a long-term basis. The BBSRC, the
MRC, NERC and the Council for the Central Laboratories of the Research
Councils spent large proportions of their funding intramurally (most of the
balance and the funding of the other Research Councils going to higher
education institutions). This ‘intramural’ spend essentially funds research
institutes ‘owned’ by the Research Councils.
One of the major changes that has affected the science spend over the last 10
years has been the growing demand for relevance. This can be interpreted in
many ways but is essentially seen as a growing requirement that the science
budget should support research that will be of relevance to wealth creation in the
UK economy. There is considerable argument as to whether research that is
basic can be so directed, and even whether it is possible to predict where basic
research will be of value. I remember Paul David at a conference a few years ago
stating that he saw the call for relevance in UK science as a sign that science had
lost the trust of government. In the 1960s, all the scientists had to say was give
us the money, trust us to spend it and society will benefit. However, an inability
to show any material pay-off from such spending has since then led to greater
and greater demands for accountability and relevance.
In higher education, the pressures have been more to do with quality and
assessment. Teaching and Research Quality exercises across higher education
institutions have been performed and are used to inform funding allocations
across departments and institutions. It is not, however, clear that the criteria for
the Research Assessment exercises well match the relevance criteria for
Research Council funding allocations.
The potential pay-offs to the science budget are considered below. Here, a
more fundamental question is addressed. Why should government fund the
science budget? One could again consider international comparisons as one
reason. The more interesting is market failure. The literature considers that there
are many market failures in basic research, ranging from externalities (the supply
of skilled manpower to UK industry) through to appropriability problems. As
always, however, market failure arguments are an imprecise means of deciding
the size of the budget (for example, although the extent of market failure in basic
research has probably not changed or has increased over the last 15 years, in the
face of financial stringency UK universities have dramatically increased their
income from non-government sources). One may also compare the funding of
UK and US universities. In the US, private funding is more extensive. Questions
that need to be answered are (a) should the government be responsible for the
costs of education, especially postgraduate education, or should this be an
individual responsibility? (b) to what extent should government fund basic
research or should the private sector as the main potential user take more
responsibility? and (c) to what extent do universities act as market institutions?
(is it the case, for example, that they are more interested in peer evaluation and
international reputation than the market value of their products?). In many ways,Fiscal Studies
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perhaps the key issue that arises in the funding of science is whether there is an
inherent incompatibility between institutions that largely consider their function
to be the production of knowledge for the public domain and a government
pushing for greater relevance of output to the needs of UK industry which will
largely benefit from knowledge kept in the private domain.
IV. THE EUROPES SYSTEM
As can be seen from Table 1, the UK government contribution to the EU
research budget has increased by 113 per cent in real terms over the 10 years to
1997–98. This reflects a growing involvement of the UK in EU-funded research
support programmes.
The UK government treats contributions to EU programmes as part of
departmental spending totals for the purposes of its public expenditure allocation
process. Thus a contribution to an EU programme is considered as a charge
against the spending total of the relevant government department. This is known
as the EUROPES system. The percentage allocations of the 1996–97 £373.3
million are as in Table 9. Clearly, it is the DTI and the OST that carry most of
this allocation of EU spending.
The implication of this EUROPES allocation is that, if the total departmental
spend is controlled, then any EU programmes are completely non-additional to
government spending. In principle, contributions to an EU programme are an
alternative to a domestic spend and not an addition. The only other European
country to have such a system of allocations is Germany. However, the German
system seems to be largely non-binding (as we shall see, the UK system may
well be).
The reasoning behind the EUROPES system was that, if government
expenditure was to be controlled, then EUROPES was a way of controlling that
TABLE 9
Departmental Attribution of EU Contribution
Department Percentage of EU
contribution charged








ai.e. no other was attributed more than 3 per cent.
Source: Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1998, Table 2.9.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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part of such expenditure that was an R&D contribution to Europe. The
EUROPES system will encourage ministries not to attempt to replicate EU
programmes at home. The problem, however, is that, within the frame budgeting
system, if the frame is not adjusted for the EUROPES contribution, then EU
R&D will drive out domestic-funded R&D. If EU R&D is of a very different
kind (for example, involving more international collaboration or more
technology support or more close to market) from the domestic R&D, then the
plans of the department concerned may not be realised.
There are some doubts, however, as to how rigidly the government adheres to
the EUROPES principles. In interviews (see Diederen et al. (1999)), it was
suggested to us that ministers may negotiate with the Treasury over a higher
departmental budget if the EUROPES spending has much different objectives
from those of the department.
One might also note that, to the extent that UK researchers are successful in
gaining EU funds over and above the contribution of the government to EU R&D
programmes, so there is an expansion of UK R&D spends. In 1996, the UK
private sector received about £140 million from the EU Commission for R&D,
with about £180 million going to universities. The total £320 million is about
£50 million less than the EU contribution.
Of course, given the EUROPES system, ministries and departments have an
incentive to argue for EU programmes that reflect their own objectives. The UK
government plays a full role in the discussions over EU R&D budgets and
spending, with the OST presenting the UK case.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SET SPEND
This section addresses issues relating to the effectiveness of UK government
expenditure on science, engineering and technology through three separate
discussions. The first concerns the general literature on the returns to
government expenditure on R&D. The second concentrates upon government
expenditure on basic research. This is relevant because, as we have seen above
(and will see below), the science budget has (and will be) taking an increasing
share of the total SET budget. Then we look at one particular policy, Launch Aid
for civil aerospace. This is explored for two main reasons, first because of its
peculiar position in the UK technology policy portfolio and second because it is
an example of an old-style product support policy that has largely disappeared
from the government (and especially DTI) portfolio.
When discussing effectiveness, a number of approaches can be taken. One is
to ask whether the policy actually satisfies the objectives set for the policy itself.
Many of the evaluation exercises undertaken within government (very few of
which are available to me) are of this kind. Such an approach seems rather
limited in scope and will not be explored here. A second approach is to consider
the pay-offs to policy in terms of impact on economic welfare and then compareFiscal Studies
248
them with the cost of the policy. Although this leaves open the issue of how
economic welfare is to be measured, it is the implicit approach taken here.
Of course, once effectiveness has been discussed, one can address the issue of
whether current levels of expenditure are too high or too low. To answer such
questions may require a degree of precision that is not available; however, they
are relevant questions to ask.
1. The General Issue
Assessing the effectiveness of government R&D spending in welfare terms
means the consideration of a number of different issues. First, the pattern of
spending is heterogeneous. There is spending to inform government, to meet
government objectives (for example, defence), on training, on basic research, to
create appropriate environments and (decreasingly) on particular new products
or processes. What is sought from the different types of spending is different and
the potential returns are different in character and probably value. Some returns
will be particularly difficult to measure and value. Thus, for example, it would
be particularly difficult to measure the social benefit of expenditure on defence
R&D. One could, of course, explore whether the defence R&D met its objectives
of developing the products targeted, but actually valuing the benefit of the
resultant defence capability is much more problematic. Similarly, the social
benefits of an informed government are difficult to value. In addition, the more
that technology policy is directed towards the creation of appropriate innovation
supportive environments, the more difficult it is to measure the return to such
spending. There is, of course, a literature on the social returns to education that
could be used to value training investments. It is fair to state, however, that
generally the economic literature when considering the return or effectiveness of
government spending on R&D has primarily concentrated upon those
expenditures that are basically direct subsidies to commercial R&D. For
example, a recent paper (the results of which are relied upon here to a large
degree) — Klette, Moen and Griliches (1999) — surveys and adds to the general
literature but constrains itself to the consideration of ‘the impact on
manufacturing performance of direct government support to commercial R&D
projects and largely ignores … issues such as the impact of research in
government labs, defence related R&D contracts, support to basic research in
universities and tax breaks for R&D’.
Even taking a rather narrow approach to effectiveness does not make the
measurement of social returns a simple exercise. There are many problems but
the three most important conceptual problems are:
(a)  If the effect of policy is to be measured, then some insight into the
counterfactual (what would have happened in the absence of policy) is
required. A necessary condition for a policy to have been effective is that itGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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produced additionality, i.e. socially desirable outcomes were generated by
the policy that would not have arisen in its absence. At the most basic level,
this might mean that the government support enabled a new product or
process to be developed (or to be developed more quickly) that would not
have been developed (or would have developed more slowly) in the absence
of the policy.
(b)  To measure the impact of policy in total, one also needs to obtain some
insight into spillovers. Spillovers can be positive or negative but are
essentially impacts that fall upon other than the direct recipients of support.
Thus, for example, if government support enables a new product to be
developed in one firm, then other firms might benefit from the knowledge
generated and also develop new products. An evaluation of the returns to
government support ought to take account of such advantages. However,
spillovers need not always be positive. It may be the case that a firm
receiving support develops a new product but this product drives (domestic)
rivals from the market. The measure of the return to the intervention based
solely upon the gains to the subsidised firm would then overstate the true
returns, for, to some degree, the measurement will wrongly reflect
redistribution.
(c)  The final issue is the time dimension over which returns are to be measured.
It may be the case that interventionist policy today not only yields benefits
today but also provides a new base from which firm(s) may build for the
future. Some benefits may thus be quite distant in time. The benefits may
also be quite widely spread. Improvements in a firm’s technological base
may not only affect its profits but also lead to higher wages, greater profits
for suppliers and also higher tax returns (thus perhaps enabling some
reduction of the actual cost of any R&D support package) etc.
It is fair to say that, although the general literature addresses some of these
issues, it has not managed to fully resolve them. Even so, the results of the
literature are informative. Griliches (1995), in a survey of the literature to that
date, argues that the returns to publicly funded R&D are less than those to
privately funded R&D. He does, however, note estimates of the social returns to
public R&D in agriculture in the range 20–80 per cent. Klette, Moen and
Griliches (1999), in their more recent work, point out that there are a number of
approaches in the literature addressing the effectiveness of R&D. They rule out
discussion of case studies and I follow them in concentrating on econometric
evaluation. I will not repeat their useful discussion of the methodological
problems of this approach, but instead concentrate upon their conclusions. They
first report upon four micro-level studies of government support for commercial
R&D (in the US, Japan, Norway and Israel). Of the four examples reviewed,
three show significant positive social benefits from government intervention.
The Norwegian project is more problematic. Surveying the wider literature,Fiscal Studies
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Klette et al. quote a number of studies that show that the social return to R&D is
much higher than the private return and that spillovers are significant in the
evaluation of government support programmes. What is not supplied, however,
is a single point estimate of the rate of return to government R&D spend of this
kind. This is not surprising. Their conclusion is much more limited. They state
that, if asked for a concise summary of the paper, the reply would be ‘It is all
very difficult’.
2. The Science Budget
Government expenditure on science could be considered a basic characteristic of
a civilised society in a manner similar to expenditure on the arts. Knowledge is
valuable for its own sake quite apart from any benefits to which it gives rise. The
problem with this argument is that, if this is all that science yields, then there is
little reason why the science spend should be more than the arts spend. It is
therefore a dangerous argument upon which to rely for the justification of such
spending. This is not to say that there is no such ‘arts-like’ benefit. It exists;
however, it is very difficult to value.
Measures of the effectiveness of or the return to the science spend thus tend
to rely upon the identification and measurement of more concrete returns. There
is a growing literature in this field, neatly summarised by Martin and Salter
(1996) in a report to HM Treasury, and thus to a large degree what I say below is
based upon that report. The report argues that ‘the traditional view of basic
research as a source merely of useful codified information is too simple and
misleading. It neglects the often larger benefits of trained researchers, improved
instrumentation and methods, tacit knowledge and membership of national and
international networks’.
Martin and Salter (hereafter M&S) quote estimates in the econometric
literature of a rate of return to basic science of 28 per cent but they consider that
the precision of this figure is open to doubt and that the methodology largely
ignores the other benefits quoted immediately above. They do accept, however,
that publicly funded basic research seems to have a substantial impact on
national productivity and competitiveness, arguably through mastery over
technology derived from better understanding of basic scientific processes
underlying technology. Such understanding will be of increasing rather than
lesser importance in the future. It is made clear that the relationship between
basic research and technological advance differs across industries and products.
The less easily measurable benefits of basic research are more difficult to
quantify. The ability to interconnect to international knowledge networks may be
of increasing importance as knowledge becomes global. The supply of highly
educated manpower is a key to understanding and utilising the world stock of
knowledge. Improved instrumentation and methodology may well be crucial to
maintaining or generating competitiveness in a number of industrial sectors.Government Spending on R&D in the UK
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Overall, the literature as reviewed by M&S indicates rates of return to basic
research that are high. The quoted 28 per cent is imprecise and is only measuring
part of the return. It would, however, suggest that greater levels of investment in
basic research in the UK could be justified, the cost of capital being considerably
less than 28 per cent.
However, the literature gives us no insight into, inter alia, whether the rate of
return is being maximised. For example, are UK science resources being placed
in the right technological areas and allocated to the most effective researchers
and are the results being used to the greatest benefit of the UK economy? In fact,
one might argue that, given the objectives of researchers (peer evaluation), there
may well be means to improve the rate of return. However, as yet, no reliable
means has been proposed that would enable reliable a priori evaluation of the
potential returns to different basic science projects. Peer evaluation, i.e. the
quality of the science, is still the main selection mechanism (even if within the
framework of Technology Foresight guidelines). Although this may not
maximise the return viewed in the traditional way, it may well be a reliable way
of maximising the other returns (for example, trained manpower, access to the
world knowledge stock, instrumentation and methods).
Overall, therefore, one might consider UK expenditure upon basic research
(the science budget) as generally effective. However, there is no guarantee that it
is maximally effective. Nor have we any guidelines that would guarantee that the
extra spending that the returns seem to suggest to be desirable is undertaken in
the most desirable areas.
3. Launch Aid
Launch Aid is one of the longest lasting of all forms of technology policy in the
UK.
2 First instituted in 1947 as a means to (re)generate a nascent civil aviation
industry in the UK, it still survives, although in a modified form, today. It is the
only form of technology policy that is embodied within an Act of Parliament
(originally the 1948 and 1949 Civil Aviation Acts and subsequently the Civil
Aviation Acts of 1968 and 1982). The principle of Launch Aid is that ‘the
government provides launch capital for non recurring development costs which
is repaid from levies or royalties on the sale of aircraft or engines’. Launch Aid
is administered by the Department of Trade and Industry and is now almost
unique in the DTI portfolio in providing support for actual product and process
development expenditures within large firms.
Launch Aid has generally been justified on the grounds that the risks
involved in the launch of new civil aircraft and engines have been too large to
expect the private firm (or its financiers) to bear. The principle behind it is thus
to shift the risk to government. With Launch Aid being a sales-contingent
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2The commentary here is largely based upon Kaivanto (1995, 1996a and 1996b). Kim Kaivanto is one of my
doctoral students.Fiscal Studies
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contract, if the project fails then it is the government that bears the loss rather
than the firm. Moreover, as the repayment terms are generally set such that the
government only recoups its initial investment, if the project is a success then the
firm will make at least the same net returns as if private funding had been used.
The actual terms of the Launch Aid contract have been changed over the
years. The latest arrangements resulted from an EC–US argument over subsidies
to national aircraft producers. The 1992 EC–US agreement entails
!  restriction of Launch Aid to 33 per cent of total development costs, with 25
per cent to be repaid at the cost of government borrowing and the remaining 8
per cent to be repaid at that rate plus 1 percentage point;
!  a maximum reimbursement period of 17 years, and 20 per cent of the
repayment to be made over the first 40 per cent of aircraft deliveries (70 per
cent over the first 85 per cent).
Launch Aid grants have always been discretionary: there is no standing or prior
provisions for Launch Aid in the government budget and thus all applications are
considered against other competing demand for government funds. There are no
set criteria that guarantee success of an application, nor are there fixed rules for
determining the government contribution.
It is worth noting that the national governments of most partners in the Airbus
consortium have adopted Launch Aid schemes to assist these partners. It also
worth noting that such risk-shifting policies exist in, for example, the
Netherlands and Finland for the support of project development in SMEs.
However, in the UK, the aerospace industry is unique in having such assistance
available to it.
As an ‘old-style’ product development policy, it is worth exploring the
effectiveness of the policy. This may be done on a number of levels. First, one
may ask whether the policy has managed to obtain returns equivalent to its
internal targets, i.e. a return equal to the investment made by government (plus
the appropriate interest charge). If it has not, one might even consider the
scheme as only a poorly veiled attempt to provide a general subsidy to the
industry.
Gardner (1976), in an early review of Launch Aid experience, argued that of
all the projects financed from 1948 through to the date of his review, only one —
the Viscount — ever paid back receipts to government. Since 1970, only seven
projects have actually been funded under Launch Aid: Concorde, RB211,
Westland 30, V2500, A320, EH101 and the A330/340. These projects generated
net disbursements (expenditure greater than receipts) on Launch Aid for each
year between 1970–71 and 1991–92 (except for a small net receipt in 1977–78).
However, by 1991–92, only the A330/340 and the EH101 were receiving Launch
Aid whereas the RB211 and the A320 were generating government receipts. The
last tranche of funding to the A330/340 was in 1992–93 so that, beyond thatGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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date, only the EH101 was still receiving Launch Aid. At the same time, receipts
from the A320, the RB211 and the A330/340 started to build up. Since 1992–93,
net Launch Aid expenditure has been negative in the range £40–60 million per
year with estimated out-turns of –£110 million in 1997–98 and –£171 million in
1998–99. These net receipts may well be reversed if new applications currently
sitting on the government’s desk (for example, the Airbus super jumbo) are
approved.
Thus, post-Concorde, Launch Aid projects have been much more successful.
Partly as a result of this and partly as a result of the unwinding of the scheme
with few new projects being started when existing projects were in the pay-back
phase, the scheme has been a net contributor to government for the last seven
years. One cannot precisely calculate pay-backs and contributions project by
project from publicly available data, but it looks as if Launch Aid has, of late at
least, been close to meeting its own internal objectives of generating a pay-back
of the loans made plus appropriate interest.
There is, however, a wider issue relating to Launch Aid. Is it effective in a
more general sense? Representatives of the civil aircraft industry have argued
that the industry is an important part of the UK economy with an impressive
export record and that, to some degree at least, this is due to the continuing
availability of Launch Aid. There are, however, a number of questions that must
be answered before one could agree that the policy is effective:
(a)  Does the policy produce additionality, i.e. would the projects that have been
undertaken not have been done without Launch Aid? The arguments here
are, of course, complex. The rationale for Launch Aid is that the private
sector would not fund the large risky projects involved. One must have
some doubt with regard to this in the light of (i) the financing found for the
Channel Tunnel project and (ii) the extent to which, over the last 15 years,
the aircraft manufacturers have been willing to take on large amounts of risk
through a switch of airlines policy from outright purchasing of civil aircraft
to one of leasing, often from manufacturers.
(b)  What is the pay-off to the UK of having a civil aviation industry? There is a
literature that argues that the existence of Airbus Industrie limits Boeing’s
monopoly power and thus keeps down world aircraft prices to the benefit of
the UK and the world economy (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988). The UK
share of this benefit is, however, small. There are, of course, the high
exports that the industry generates. However, one cannot but wonder
whether the skills and knowledge used in civil aircraft might be better
employed elsewhere in the economy or whether the use of Launch Aid to
help SMEs in other industries to develop and launch new products may
have yielded a bigger pay-off.
(c)  One might note, however, that, with the increasing internationalisation of
the civil aircraft industry and the involvement of the UK industry inFiscal Studies
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international projects where the partners are receiving Launch Aid from
their national governments, it may be rather difficult to draw back from the
policy.
VI. THE FUTURE
With the coming to power of the Labour government in May 1997, a major
comprehensive spending review was initiated across all government departments
and all areas of spending including R&D. Published figures (in SET98) on
spending plans originating from prior to the conclusion of that review thus
became obsolete as new priorities and spending patterns were put in place. At
the time of writing, however, there are no publicly available data on the totality
of the government’s future R&D spending plans (as of early July 1999, details of
Forward Look 1999 and Science, Engineering and Technology Statistics 1999
are just beginning to appear on the DTI web page). This section thus considers
just three areas, making use of what data are available. The first area is science,
where increased spending plans have been announced. The second area is
defence, where some material is available. The third area is the DTI, where the
Competitiveness White Paper gives reasonable guidance as to the future.
1. The Science Budget 1999–00 to 2001–02
Information taken from the DTI/OST home page entitled ‘Allocations of the
science budget 1999–00 to 2001–02’ provides details of the outcome of the
Comprehensive Spending Review as it affects the science budget. The plan is to
increase the science budget by £700 million over three years in the context of
additional support to the science and engineering base (i.e. including the Higher
Education Funding Councils) of £1.4 billion. The planned spend and recent
spends are as in Table 10.
The extra expenditure thus reverses recent (1996–97 to 1998–99) real
declines in the science budget and will probably reinforce the increasing share of
the government R&D budget going to the science and engineering base (SEB).
The extra funding going to the SEB over and above the increase in the science
budget is made up of three parts (over three years): an extra £300 million for the
DFEE, £100 million to build a new synchroton radiation source at Daresbury (a
project to which the Wellcome Trust will also contribute), plus another £300
million as half of a Joint Infrastructure Fund (joint with the Wellcome Trust) to
address the infrastructure problem in universities. The direct collaboration with a
research funding charity (the Wellcome Trust), especially on this scale, is a new
initiative for the UK government.
The current government view of science funding can be transmitted through
two relevant quotations from the source: ‘The Science Base is the absolute
bedrock of our economic performance’ and ‘A viable and internationallyGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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competitive research base is accepted as essential to the future industrial and
commercial strength of the country, and hence also to the prosperity and well
being of the UK population’. However, perhaps as a warning, this document also
states
A key finding of the Comprehensive Spending Review was that, while much has been done
in recent years to encourage exploitation of Science Base outcomes, still more is needed. In
particular there is a need to increase the degree of interaction between UK firms and the
Science Base, to ensure that UK firms maximise their opportunities to become fully
competitive and to ensure that maximum value is realised from the public investment in the
Science Base.
To facilitate such interaction, a University Challenge Fund (using £20 million
from the science budget and £20 million from the Wellcome Foundation and the
Gatsby Trust) has been initiated to encourage, through seed funding, the
transformation of ‘good research into good business’.
2. Defence R&D
Research Fortnight (28 April 1999) indicates that, in cash terms, the defence
research budget planned for 1999–00 will be £453 million. This is seen as a fall
of 15 per cent in cash terms since 1996–97 and of almost 50 per cent in real
terms since 1985. The falling share of defence R&D in the total R&D spend will
thus continue into the future. The source also suggests that the Defence
Evaluation and Research Agency is poised for at least partial privatisation.
TABLE 10













Source: ‘Allocations of the science budget 1999–00 to 2001–02’, from the DTI/OST web page.Fiscal Studies
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3. The Department of Trade and Industry
Although no hard data are available on future DTI R&D spends, it is clear from
the Competitiveness White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998) that
the department’s current emphasis upon enabling innovation through creating an
innovation-friendly environment will continue, as opposed to any return to
explicit subsidies for particular product and process innovations. The White
Paper also fully embraces the concept of the knowledge economy and expresses
a desire and measures to ensure that the UK will be a full participant in the world
knowledge economy. The environmental improvements encompass, inter alia,
changes in regulations, reviews of tax regimes, encouraging private R&D
spending, improving the functioning of capital markets, improving competitive
pressures, improving the skills base and encouraging innovation and productivity
in government.
4. The Future: An Overview
Although the future pattern of the government R&D spend is not entirely clear,
the main characteristics appear to be an increased science spend, a reduced
military spend and a technology policy that is more concerned with the
innovative climate than with subsidising particular projects, processes or firms
(except perhaps for Launch Aid). This is very much a reinforcement of recent
trends. In terms of evaluation, it reflects the apparent effectiveness of basic
research (although emphasises that full benefits will only be realised if the
science base is fully exploited). The defence R&D reductions may also well
reflect the current rather catholic view of the need for and pay-off from such
spending. The continuing DTI emphasis on issues relating to the innovative
environment is not fully consistent with the academic literature, which suggests
that there may well be pay-offs to government support for particular products
and processes. It may well, however, reflect some scepticism as to whether such
spending has been effective in the UK in the past.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Over the 10 years through to 1998, the UK government has reduced its
expenditure on science, engineering and technology (SET) and research and
development (R&D). The remaining spending has been reorientated towards
science and the basic end of the spectrum, and away from both defence R&D and
the support of technology and particularly the support of particular products and
processes in large firms. Recent policy announcements of enhanced spending
upon the science base will further emphasise the move towards the basic end of
the spectrum.
There are a number of causes that lead governments to spend on R&D. The
main primary purposes of government R&D in the UK are to support theGovernment Spending on R&D in the UK
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provision of government services (largely defence) and general support
(including the science spend). Technology support activity — i.e. the stimulation
of particular technologies in UK industry — is now relatively unimportant in the
total spend. Different purposes are justified on different grounds. I have argued
that market failure is endemic in technological change and market failure can
and has been used to justify government spending both on science and on
technology support. On the other hand, concern with the international
competitiveness of the UK economy is also used as a justification.
This paper has reviewed the SET activities of the two main spending
departments — the MOD and the DTI — and the science budget. In doing so, it
has raised more questions than answers. The effectiveness of general technology
support policies, Launch Aid and the science spend has also been reviewed. My
review of effectiveness is generally positive. This positive attitude indicates that
further government R&D spending may be justified, and my quick look at the
future suggests that, in science at least, higher spending is in prospect. For the
MOD, the opposite appears to be the case. The DTI, on the other hand, appears
to be continuing its emphasis upon the creation of an innovation-friendly
environment rather than high levels of spending per se.
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